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Fulton v Globalia (The New Flamenco) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel SAU (The New Flamenco)1 the 
Supreme Court considered the circumstances in which benefits received by the claimant, 
arising from steps that the claimant would not have taken but for the defendant’s breach of 
contract, must be taken into account in the assessment of damages. The result of the appeal was 
eagerly awaited by many observers, not least by the present authors because, in earlier issues 
of this journal,2 we had expressed different views concerning the outcome in the Court of 
Appeal. As it transpired, however, the single judgment delivered by Lord Clarke3 came as 
something of a let-down because it contains only seven paragraphs of discussion and no citation 
of authority apart from the cases referred to in reciting the lower Courts’ reasoning. Our aim in 
this note is to supplement the Supreme Court’s own short reasoning with a fuller analysis of 
how its approach differed from the Court of Appeal,4 whose decision the Court reversed in 
favour of the decision and reasoning of Popplewell J in the High Court.5 
 
The essential facts were as follows. The respondent charterers repudiated a two-year time 
charter of a small cruise ship, the New Flamenco. At the time there was no substitute two-year 
time charter available in the market. The owners immediately sold the ship for a price of 
$US23,765,000. Although this was a step that the owners could probably have taken at any 
time during the term of the charter, they did not appear to dispute that they would not in fact 
have sold the ship but for the breach.6 They subsequently sought to recover the net loss of 
profits they would have earned (some €7.5m) if the charter had not been repudiated. However, 
since the value of the ship when the charter was due to end would have been a mere $7,000,000 
 primarily because of the fall in the charter market brought about by the Lehman Brothers 
collapse  the charterers argued that the difference of $16,765,000 between this sum and the 
actual sale price must be brought into account, resulting in an award of nominal damages 
because this benefit exceeded the lost profits claimed. The arbitrator agreed, Popplewell J 
disagreed and, after being reversed by the Court of Appeal, Popplewell J’s decision was 
reinstated by the Supreme Court. 
 
As we both pointed out in our earlier notes, it would plainly be over-simplistic in a case 
such as this to rely on the letter of the compensatory principle to hold that the claimant can 
never be put in a better position (all things considered) than if the breach had not occurred. 
Indeed, neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court took this approach. But the difficult 
issue is then to specify the circumstances under which a benefit resulting from the claimant’s 
own conduct will be ignored in assessing damages. Here, despite their differing conclusions, 
both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court correctly raised the issue of whether or not 
                                                          
1  [2017] UKSC 43; [2017] 1 WLR 2581. 
2  [2016] LMCLQ 202 and 459. 
3  With whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge agreed. 
4  [2015] EWCA Civ 1299; [2016] 1 WLR 2450; [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 383. 
5  [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm); [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 230. 
6  See also ibid [12] (Popplewell J): ‘The arbitrator made findings that the sale of the Vessel by the Owners in 
October 2007 was caused by the Charterers’ breach…’. Regardless of whether this refers to factual or legal 
causation, it appears to entail that the arbitrator regarded the but for test as satisfied. 
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the claimant made a choice, or was “speculating”, to adopt the terminology that is most familiar 
in this context. Where the Courts differed (implicitly) was in answer to the subtler question: 
choice as to what? Unfortunately, Lord Clarke’s brief analysis failed to pinpoint this as the 
source of divergence from the Court of Appeal. We aim to clarify the issue by enumerating the 
various choices that may (or may not) have been open to the claimants on the present facts, 
together with their significance for the application of the compensatory principle. 
 
2. A factual ambiguity 
 
There is one important respect in which the facts of The New Flamenco were unclear. This 
concerns the range of viable options open to the claimants at the time of the repudiation. In 
particular, the arbitrator’s findings were ambiguous as to whether there was no alternative 
employment available for the vessel at all (either on the spot market or pursuant to shorter term 
time charters), or whether there was merely no substitute two-year time charter available as a 
direct substitute for the outstanding term of the original charter. This distinction is potentially 
important. If no alternative employment was available, it looks as though the options open to 
the claimants were severely constrained. In the absence of any form of substitute hire being 
available, it seems plausible that the only viable option would have been to sell the vessel. But, 
if alternative employment was available, the sale would have taken place against the 
background that a decision to seek substitute hire could have been taken instead, albeit not in 
direct substitution for the original charter. 
 
The arbitrator’s reported findings7 refer to both possibilities. Thus, he said that “there was 
no suitable time charter employment for the vessel”, that “there was no charterparty 
employment for the vessel at the time in question”,8 and that the sale was a “necessity”,9 but 
he also referred to it not being “possible for the Owners to conclude an alternative substitute 
two-year time charterparty”.10 Neither the judgment of Popplewell J nor the judgments of the 
Court of Appeal shed any further light on this element of the facts, nor did they explicitly advert 
to potential importance of the ambiguity. In the Supreme Court, however, Lord Clarke 
appeared implicitly to assume that shorter charters were available in his conclusion that “the 
measure of the loss is the difference between the contract rate and what was or ought reasonably 
to have been earned from employment of the vessel under shorter charterparties, as for example 
on the spot market”.11 
 
3. Reasoning of the arbitrator, Popplewell J and the Court of Appeal 
 
The arbitrator held that the difference between the price obtained from selling the ship after the 
repudiation and the value of the ship had the charter been performed was a benefit that should 
be brought into account since the sale was caused by the breach and was a reasonable step 
taken to mitigate the damage. In his view, “there was no reason why capital savings could not 
and should not be brought into account in considering the net loss suffered by the owners”.12 
 
                                                          
7  Ibid, [12]. 
8  This was also roughly the formulation adopted by the claimants in the narrative of facts presented on appeal 
to the Supreme Court. 
9  [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm); [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 230, [12] (paras 3, 23 and 70 of the award). 
10  Ibid (para 60 of the award) (emphasis added). 
11  [2017] UKSC 43; [2017] 1 WLR 2581, [34]. See further text following n 57 below. 
12  [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm); [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 230, [12]. 
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Popplewell J disagreed, holding instead that the benefit of the sale was not “legally caused 
by the breach”.13 In order to bring the benefit into account in the assessment of damages, there 
had to be “a direct causative connection between breach and benefit”14 whereas in this case the 
decision to sell, although triggered by the breach, was “legally independent”15 therefrom. In 
particular, the reason why the sale of the vessel was independent of the breach was that the 
owners had a choice whether or not to realise the capital value of the ship at any time, including 
during the remaining period of the charter. Accordingly, whether they did so was a matter for 
their own “commercial judgment and involved a commercial risk taken for their own 
account”.16 The decision thus rested on the concept of “speculation” commonly invoked in 
relation to claimants’ post-breach conduct. 
 
Popplewell J gave several ancillary reasons for his decision. First, it made no difference 
that the arbitrator had found that the sale was a reasonable step to take in mitigation of loss. 
The loss that was mitigated was the loss of net profits from the charter. The sale achieved this 
by removing the costs involved in operating or laying up the ship. Secondly, although the 
difference in kind between the capital benefit derived from the sale of the ship and the claimed 
loss of rental income did not in itself justify a refusal to bring that benefit into account, it was 
“indicative that it was not a benefit which was legally caused by the breach, notwithstanding 
that it flowed from a step which was in reasonable mitigation of loss caused by the breach”.17 
Thirdly, the situation before the Court was analogous to those cases in which it had been held 
that some post-breach benefits, such as donations from third parties and the proceeds of 
insurance and pension schemes paid for or contributed to by the claimant, should be ignored 
on policy grounds. When the owners purchased the ship they undertook “the risk of fluctuations 
in its capital value” and “[t]o allow the charterers to take the benefit of their decision to sell at 
what turned out to be an opportune moment in market conditions would be to allow the 
charterers to appropriate the fruits of the owners’ investment in the vessel in a way which would 
be unfair and unjust”.18 Finally, the judge noted the lack of any authority directly supporting 
the charterers’ argument, the logical corollary of which was that, if the market had actually 
risen and the vessel had doubled in value by the time the charter was due to end, the owners 
could have claimed the capital loss suffered. He clearly thought that such a claim would be 
unsustainable.19  
 
Popplewell J’s decision was reversed by a unanimous Court of Appeal. The judgments 
were delivered by Longmore and Christopher Clarke LJJ, Sales LJ agreeing with both 
judgments. Their decision essentially hinged on the fact that there was no available market for 
substitute charters at the time of the repudiation.20 If a substitute charter had been available to 
the claimants, the correct measure of damages would have been the difference between the 
contract and substitute market rates of hire. As explained by Robert Goff J in the well-known 
case of The Elena D’Amico,21 this is so regardless of whether the claimant actually goes into 
the market for substitute hire or not. Any subsequent gains or losses resulting from the choice 
not to seek substitute hire would be for the claimant’s own account. Thus, if a gain is made, it 
will be the result of an independent decision not “arising out of the breach”. In such a case, 
                                                          
13  Ibid, [65]. 
14  Ibid, [64]. 
15  Ibid, [66]. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid, [69]. 
18  Ibid, [73]. 
19  Ibid, [77]. 
20  Although note the residual ambiguity latent in this premise: see text following n 7 above. 
21  Koch Marine Inc v D’Amica Societa di Navigazione ARL [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 75. 
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“measure of damages and mitigation walk hand in hand”.22 Their Lordships thus accepted that, 
if there had been an available market for substitute hire in the present case, the owners’ actual 
decision to sell the ship would have been ignored and they would have been entitled to recover 
damages measured by the difference between the contract and substitute market rates. 
 
However, the Court of Appeal reasoned that since there was no such market, the present 
case fell to be decided according to the principle in the leading case of British Westinghouse,23 
namely, that “if a claimant adopts by way of mitigation a measure which arises out of the 
consequences of the breach and is in the ordinary course of business and such measure benefits 
the claimant, that benefit is normally to be brought into account in assessing the claimant’s loss 
unless the measure is wholly independent of the relationship of the claimant and the 
defendant”.24 Thus, in the absence of any “speculation” by the claimants then whatever steps 
are in fact taken by the claimants will be regarded as mitigation, such that their “consequences 
will ‘arise’, generally speaking, from the consequences of the breach of contract”.25 On the 
facts as the Court of Appeal took them, since the sale did not involve any speculation on the 
part of the claimants there was “no sound reason not to take into account the benefit of a sale 
made at the top of a falling market when it is that sale which was both the cause of the benefit 
and the act of mitigation  a circumstance which precludes it being treated as res inter alios 
acta”.26 
 
Three other aspects of their Lordships’ reasoning should also be noted. First, they 
recognised that if the converse situation had arisen and, due to a rise in the sale market, the 
value of the ship at the end of the charter would have been substantially higher than the price 
obtained earlier, “the charterers would be liable for the owners’ inability to take advantage of 
that rise in the market, if the sale had arisen from the consequences of the breach of contract 
and been undertaken by way of mitigating the loss caused by that breach”.27 In other words, 
their conclusion cut both ways. Secondly, Popplewell J’s “somewhat elaborate principle of 
causation” under which “there must be a direct causative connection between breach and 
benefit”28 was rejected and his associated argument that the owners could have sold the ship at 
any time subject to the charter was dismissed as “somewhat of a side issue”.29 Instead, the 
Court of Appeal emphasised that the British Westinghouse test as to whether the benefit arose 
from the consequences of the breach and in the ordinary course of business was “a sufficient 
formulation of the causative link”.30 Thirdly, Popplewell J’s argument that it would be unjust 
to require the benefit from the owners’ capital investment in the ship to be brought into account 
was also rejected. While acknowledging that “[t]he search for legal principle in this area is 
undoubtedly elusive”,31 their Lordships did not regard the benefit as analogous to the likes of 
insurance or pension payments. The arbitrator was justified in applying the “even more 
fundamental” compensatory principle.32 The owners “had made a considerable profit from the 
action they took by way of mitigating what would otherwise have been an undoubted loss” and 
                                                          
22  [2015] EWCA Civ 1299; [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 383, [49] (Christopher Clarke LJ). 
23  British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd 
[1912] AC 673. 
24  [2015] EWCA Civ 1299; [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 383, [23] (Longmore LJ). 
25  Ibid, [25]. 
26  Ibid, [50] (Christopher Clarke LJ). 
27  Ibid, [30] (Longmore LJ). 
28  Ibid. See also Christopher Clarke LJ at [46]. 
29  Ibid, [35]. 
30  Ibid, [38]. 
31  Ibid, [39]. 
32  Ibid. 
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“[t]hat profit arose from the consequences of the breach and should therefore be brought into 
account”.33 This conclusion was seen as consistent with the reiterations of the compensatory 
principle in The Golden Victory34 and Bunge SA v Nidera BV.35 Furthermore, the arbitrator had 
formed a “commonsense overall judgment” on the sufficiency of the causal nexus between the 
breach and the benefit and had not made an error of law in doing so.36 
 
4. The Supreme Court’s reasoning 
 
The Supreme Court restored Popplewell J’s decision and endorsed his reasoning in a single 
judgment delivered by Lord Clarke that, after setting out the facts and the reasoning of the 
lower Courts, contained very little in the way of original discussion. The reasoning was 
expressed in terms of both causation and mitigation, in that “[t]he benefit to be brought into 
account must have been caused either by the breach of the charterparty or by a successful act 
of mitigation”.37 Lord Clarke concluded that the benefit of sale “was … not on the face of it 
caused by the repudiation of the charterparty”.38 In reaching this conclusion, his Lordship 
adopted Popplewell J’s reasoning that, in selling the vessel, the owners were “making a 
commercial decision at their own risk”.39 Sadly for enthusiasts of causation and mitigation, but 
perhaps mercifully for casual observers of the field, the whole of Lord Clarke’s own reasoning 
can be recounted by the citation of just three paragraphs.40 
 
First, the reason why there was no causal connection on the facts was not, as the owners 
had argued, because “the benefit must be of the same kind as the loss caused by the 
wrongdoer”,41 but rather because:42 
 
“there was nothing about the premature termination of the charterparty which made it necessary to 
sell the vessel, either at all or at any particular time. Indeed, it could have been sold during the term 
of the charterparty. If the owners decide to sell the vessel, whether before or after termination of 
the charterparty, they are making a commercial decision at their own risk about the disposal of an 
interest in the vessel which was no part of the subject matter of the charterparty and had nothing to 
do with the charterers.” 
 
Secondly, and in common with the reasoning of both Popplewell J and the Court of Appeal, 
Lord Clarke acknowledged that this causal reasoning cut both ways:43 
 
                                                          
33  Ibid. 
34  Golden Strait Corpn v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha [2007] UKHL 12; [2007] 2 AC 353. 
35  [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 469. 
36  [2015] EWCA Civ 1299; [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 383, [42], citing Famosa Shipping Co Ltd v Armada Bulk 
Carriers Ltd (The Fanis) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 633, 637 (Mance J). 
37  [2017] UKSC 43; [2017] 1 WLR 2581, [30]. 
38  Ibid, [32]. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Lord Clarke did add a further, and concluding, paragraph which it is unnecessary to discuss at any length. 
His Lordship tentatively suggested (at [35]) that “[i]f the vessel were sold, say, a year into the two-year period 
when it would have been employed under the repudiated charterparty, the sale of the vessel would or might 
be relevant for some purposes” which he then proceeded to outline briefly. Since his Lordship had already 
decided that the actual sale of the vessel should be ignored, it is difficult to see why a later sale should make 
any difference. Surely, unless there had been some material change in market conditions, that sale would be 
ignored for the same reason that the immediate sale was ignored. 
41  Ibid, [30]. 
42  Ibid, [32]. 
43  Ibid, [33]. 
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“As I see it, the absence of a relevant causal link is the reason why they could not have claimed the 
difference in the market value of the vessel if the market value would have risen between the time 
of the sale in 2007 and the time when the charterparty would have terminated in November 2009. 
For the same reason, the owners cannot be required to bring into account the benefit gained by the 
fall in value. The analysis is the same even if the owners’ commercial reason for selling is that there 
is no work for the vessel. At the most, that means that the premature termination is the occasion for 
selling the vessel. It is not the legal cause of it. There is equally no reason to assume that the relevant 
comparator is a sale in November 2009. A sale would not have followed from the lawful redelivery 
at the end of the charterparty term, any more than it followed from the premature termination in 
2007. The causal link fails at both ends of the transaction.” 
 
Thirdly, Lord Clarke thought that the same outcome could be expressed in terms of 
mitigation:44 
 
“For the same reasons the sale of the ship was not on the face of it an act of successful mitigation. 
If there had been an available charter market, the loss would have been the difference between the 
actual charterparty rate and the assumed substitute contract rate. The sale of the vessel would have 
been irrelevant. In the absence of an available market, the measure of the loss is the difference 
between the contract rate and what was or ought reasonably to have been earned from employment 
of the vessel under shorter charterparties, as for example on the spot market. The relevant mitigation 
in that context is the acquisition of an income stream alternative to the income stream under the 
original charterparty. The sale of the vessel was not itself an act of mitigation because it was 
incapable of mitigating the loss of the income stream.” 
 
Curiously, the explanation adopted by Lord Clarke in his opening summary of the Court’s 
decision appears largely detached from the key issues discussed in each of these three 
paragraphs. Instead his Lordship said in that summary that “the fall in value of the vessel was 
… irrelevant because the owners’ interest in the capital value of the vessel had nothing to do 
with the interest injured by the charterers’ repudiation of the charterparty”.45 On its face, this 
explanation looks rather more like the “difference in kind” reasoning that he went on explicitly 
to reject. In any event, it is not immediately obvious how this issue concerning the nature of 
the claimant’s contractual interest relates to the causal reasoning that drove the rest of the 
Court’s analysis. It may instead offer a third way (along with causation and mitigation) of 
interpreting the decision, but the point was left undeveloped. 
 
5.  Choice as to what? Applying “speculation” reasoning 
 
Lord Clarke’s reasoning depended crucially on the contention that “[i]f the owners decide to 
sell the vessel, whether before or after termination of the charterparty, they are making a 
commercial decision at their own risk”.46 This idea  that the claimant made a choice and so 
should be responsible for the consequences, for better or worse  is a familiar feature within 
the cases on mitigation.47 Indeed, the reasoning of the arbitrator and Court of Appeal also 
focused on precisely this issue, but it led them to the opposite conclusion: both held that the 
sale was a “necessity” and so not a matter of choice. It is very unfortunate that the Supreme 
                                                          
44  Ibid, [34]. 
45  Ibid, [29]. 
46  Ibid, [32]. 
47  See, eg, Jamal v Moolla Dawood Sons & Co [1916] 1 AC 175 (PC); Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders & 
Shippers Ltd [1954] 2 QB 459 (QB) 494; Koch Marine Inc v D’Amica Societa di Navigazione ARL (The 
Elena d'Amico) [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 75 (QB), 8788; Blue Circle Industries plc v Ministry of Defence [1999] 
Ch 289 (CA), 317, 321; Primavera v Allied Dunbar Assurance plc [2002] EWCA Civ 1327; [2003] Lloyd’s 
Rep PN 14, [40], [52]. 
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Court did not explicitly address this difference of opinion. We suggest that the application of 
the choice (or speculation) principle requires closer attention to the question: choice as to what? 
In our view, the claimants are “speculating” at their own risk only if they make a choice not to 
put themselves as nearly as possible in the position that they would have been in if the breach 
had not occurred (what we call the “non-breach position”). 
 
To show how this analysis works, it is helpful to consider each of the three main 
possibilities that could have obtained at the time the repudiation was accepted: (a) a substitute 
two-year time charter was available to replace the entire outstanding term of the original 
charter, (b) alternative employment, either on the spot market or pursuant to shorter term time 
charters, was available collectively to replace the outstanding term, or (c) no charter work or 
other commercial use at all was available for the vessel. The first scenario was, of course, ruled 
out by the arbitrator’s findings, but a consideration of it will help inform the correct legal 
approach to the two alternatives, as to which the findings of fact were ambiguous. We contend 
that both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal failed adequately to clarify how their 
respective understandings of the “speculation” or “choice” principle of causation would apply 
in each of these three scenarios. Insofar as both Courts did give some clues as to their favoured 
approach to each scenario, we also consider that neither Court’s reasoning was entirely correct. 
 
(a) A substitute two-year charter was available 
 
Let us suppose that a substitute two-year time charter had been available in the market yet the 
owners chose not to take it because they had received a favourable offer to purchase the vessel. 
As discussed in the Court of Appeal, it is axiomatic that the benefit arising from the sale would 
not have affected recovery of the ordinary measure of damages of the difference between the 
contract rate of hire and the market rate. The existence of an available market would have 
enabled the owners to restore (as nearly as possible) the same position that they would have 
been in if the contract had not been breached, but their choice not to restore this “non-breach” 
position would have constituted an independent decision for which they were responsible, for 
better or worse. It would have been this decision, not the charterers’ repudiation, that was the 
legal cause of the ensuing financial consequences, which turned out to be favourable but could 
equally have been unfavourable. In other words, any gain or loss from market fluctuations is 
irrelevant. The breach is merely the trigger or occasion for such gain or loss, not the cause 
thereof in law. 
 
The Supreme Court, as we have seen, was in full agreement with the outcome that we have 
suggested in this scenario. Lord Clarke said that “[i]f there had been an available charter 
market, the loss would have been the difference between the actual charterparty rate and the 
assumed substitute contract rate”.48 But the reason given for treating the benefit arising from 
the sale as irrelevant is different. It was not that the presence of an available market gives the 
owners a choice whether or not to restore their non-breach position but, in effect, that, 
regardless of the state of the market at the time the repudiation was accepted, there is no causal 
connection between the termination of the charter and the sale. This is because the termination 
could not be said to have “made it necessary to sell the vessel, either at all or at any particular 
time. Indeed, it could have been sold during the term of the charterparty.”49 His Lordship would 
no doubt reconcile this with the arbitrator’s finding that the sale was a “necessity” by saying 
                                                          
48  [2017] UKSC 43; [2017] 1 WLR 2581, [34]. 
49  Ibid, [32]. 
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that it was not legally necessary for the above reason and that it “was not itself an act of 
mitigation because it was incapable of mitigating the loss of the income stream”.50 
 
As suggested earlier, the latter reason comes close to an application of the principle that the 
judge rejected, namely, that “the benefit must be of the same kind as the loss caused by the 
wrongdoer”.51 However, that aside, in our view, it cannot be decisive that the relevant post-
breach conduct (here, sale of the vessel) could have occurred at any time, even before the 
breach. Take a very simple example of the sale of defective goods. If, after discovering the 
defect, the buyer goes into the market to buy replacement goods, it is uncontroversial that the 
consequences of these steps are taken into account in the assessment of damages. The defendant 
seller must pay damages for the cost of the replacement regardless of the fact that the buyer 
could have bought these other goods at any time. Accordingly, if Lord Clarke’s point is 
decisive, it would have to follow that the purchase of replacement goods in our example has to 
be ignored, but that is obviously not the law. In our view, the question whether the conduct 
could have occurred at any time might sometimes provide a useful guide, but only insofar as it 
goes to show that the steps taken by the claimant were not part of any attempt to restore the 
non-breach position. 
 
In summary, on this variation of the facts, the outcome supposed by the Court of Appeal 
and Supreme Court is the same, but in our view the Court of Appeal’s reasoning (and not Lord 
Clarke’s) is correct. 
 
(b) Shorter charters or spot-hires were available 
 
In the Court of Appeal, their Lordships appeared to think that it was irrelevant whether shorter 
charters were available in the market; the only relevant available market was one for a 
substitute two-year charter.52 Only where there was a substitute two-year charter would the 
benefit from selling the vessel be caused, not by the breach, but by their independent decision 
not to take advantage of the market. Longmore LJ cited in support,53 inter alia, Spar Shipping 
A/S v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co Ltd54 where Popplewell J ruled that an 
available market requires “a like-for-like replacement”, for the following reasons:55 
 
“Where at the date of termination there is no market available for a replacement charter for the full 
length of the unexpired term, there is no ‘available market’. This is because a time charter for a 
particular period reflects the appetite for risk which the owner and charterer are willing to take for 
that period … A six-month time charter represents a different bargain from a two-year charter 
because of the different nature of the risk each party is willing to run. If the unexpired term is two 
years and there is no appetite in the market to fix for longer than six months, the owner cannot 
replace what he has lost in specie. Four successive six-month charters are not a like-for-like 
replacement for a two-year charter.” 
 
We are not convinced, however, that the existence of an available market should be determined 
in such a binary manner. Even a substitute charter that matches the original in terms of length 
will never be a perfect substitute or replacement “in specie”. Apart obviously from being with 
a different counterparty and for a different rate of hire, it is also likely that the substitute will 
                                                          
50  Ibid, [34]. 
51  Ibid, [30]. 
52  See [2015] EWCA Civ 1299; [2016] 1 WLR 2450; [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 383, [29] and [30]. 
53  Ibid, [29]. 
54  [2015] EWHC 718 (Comm; [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 407, [221][226]. 
55  Ibid, [222]. 
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contain different material terms relating to operational matters such as off-hire, permissible 
geographical limits etc. The underlying question must always be: what steps would restore the 
claimants as nearly as possible to the position that they would have been in but for the breach? 
In this respect, there will always be a continuum of possible substitutes, from the closest 
available (compared with the original contract) to more distant substitutes. Of course, a two-
year charter is closer than a series of shorter charters or spot-hires but, in our view, it is wrong 
to think that these two possibilities are of a completely different kind. In determining whether 
shipowners are engaged in speculation following a repudiated charter, we should not be asking 
purely whether there was an available market for a perfect substitute, because there never is. 
Instead, the question is whether the owners made a choice not to avail themselves of the closest 
substitute that was available. 
 
Applying this approach, we think that in The New Flamenco, if a series of shorter charters 
was indeed available but the owners chose to sell the vessel anyway, the Supreme Court were 
correct to conclude that the sale involved speculation for which the owners were responsible, 
for better or worse. In the absence of a substitute two-year charter, shorter charters were the 
closest substitute available and yet the owners chose not to take advantage of them. Of course, 
as we have already noted, this was not in fact Lord Clarke’s reasoning.56 However, his Lordship 
did incidentally appear to assume that shorter charters were available. This is because he said 
that “[i]n the absence of an available market [for a substitute two-year charter], the measure of 
the loss is the difference between the contract rate and what was or ought reasonably to have 
been earned from employment of the vessel under shorter charterparties, as for example on the 
spot market”.57 This measure only makes sense on the assumption that shorter charters were 
available, otherwise assessment on this basis would be inappropriate for exactly the same 
reason as using the market rate for two-year charters was inappropriate, ie, there was no such 
rate because there was no available market. 
 
A slightly more tricky variation would have arisen if shorter charters had not been available 
in The New Flamenco, but the owners could instead have spot-hired the vessel by converting 
it to use as a research ship, or chartered it for use as a floating hotel (which we understand is 
the actual use that the buyers eventually put it to). The answer can only be found by asking the 
central question: can it be said that by selling the vessel instead of, for example, chartering it 
as above for use as a floating hotel, the owners have chosen not to restore as nearly as possible 
the position that they would have been in but for the breach? Of course, there will come a point 
where none of the available options are really anything at all like the non-breach position, and 
at this point (but only then) the court may appropriately conclude that the owners’ decision to 
sell must be taken into account in the assessment of damages, again for better or worse. 
 
In summary, on this variation of the facts we disagree with the Court of Appeal’s analysis 
and have more sympathy with the outcome endorsed by the Supreme Court, albeit for different 
reasons. 
 
(c) No commercial use at all was available 
 
Having decided that the benefit of the sale was to be ignored on the facts of The New Flamenco, 
Lord Clarke stated that “[t]he analysis is the same even if the owners’ commercial reason for 
selling is that there is no work for the vessel”.58 In this respect, we think that the Supreme 
                                                          
56  See further text following n 48 above. 
57  [2017] UKSC 43; [2017] 1 WLR 2581, [34]. 
58  Ibid, [33]. 
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Court’s decision goes too far. If there really was no commercial use at all for the vessel in the 
hands of the owners, then the sale may appropriately be regarded as a “necessity” in line with 
the reasoning of the arbitrator and the Court of Appeal. The claimants would have, in all 
practical respects, no other choice but to sell the vessel. Since the sale would not then involve 
a choice not to restore the non-breach position as nearly as possible, we think that it would be 
incorrect to regard the sale as “speculation”. Or to put it another way, in these circumstances 
the benefit obtained as a result of the early sale is legally caused by the repudiation because it 
would not have occurred but for the breach and there is no voluntary conduct on the part of the 
claimants that serves to break the chain of causation. Thus, the consequences should be taken 
into account in the assessment of damages, for better or worse. 
 
A good example of these circumstances, and of the outcome that we propose on this 
hypothesis, was cited by the Court of Appeal in the present case.59 In Bulkhaul Ltd v Rhodia 
Organique Fine Ltd,60 Bulkhaul leased to Rhodia 18 bespoke tanks for the transport of highly 
corrosive chemicals at a daily rent of £18.50 per tank. The lease was for a term of 10 years, by 
which time the tanks would have had no remaining commercial use. Some five years into the 
term Rhodia repudiated the contract. Bulkhaul accepted the repudiation and claimed damages 
in the amount of the rent for the remainder of the term, there apparently being no chance of 
securing substitute leases. The Court of Appeal held that Bulkhaul, who had no remaining use 
for the tanks when they were redelivered, could have mitigated their loss by selling them. If 
they had done so, they would have been paid £360,000 (£20,000 per tank). Accordingly, it was 
held that this amount, less selling costs of £2,000 per tank, should be deducted from the 
damages claimed. Obviously, if Bulkhaul had in fact sold the tanks, the Court would have had 
no hesitation in holding that the net amount realised must be brought into account. 
 
In summary, on this variation of the facts, we agree with the outcome supposed by the 
Court of Appeal, together with their reasoning that sale was a “necessity” and hence not a 
matter of speculation. In such circumstances, contrary to the Supreme Court’s implication, we 
fail to see how a sale by the owners could be regarded as a “commercial decision at their own 
risk”. 
 
6. The result of the appeal 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to allow the owners’ appeal on the basis that the actual sale was 
“irrelevant” did not itself conclude the appropriate measure of damages. Whenever a court 
holds that it is appropriate to ignore what actually happened as a result of the breach, it must 
rest its assessment of the claimant’s “breach position” on a counterfactual hypothesis instead. 
On this issue, Lord Clarke suggested (though not as part of his formal “disposal”) that “the 
measure of the loss is the difference between the contract rate and what was or ought reasonably 
to have been earned from employment of the vessel under shorter charterparties, as for example 
on the spot market.”61 It is important to emphasise that on this measure, the Supreme Court’s 
decision to ignore the actual sale does not result in the owners recovering the full loss of profits 
that they would have earned under the original charter. Instead, they recover only the difference 
between those profits and the profits that could alternatively have been earned by seeking 
shorter charters or spot hires. 
 
                                                          
59  [2015] EWCA Civ 1299; [2016] 1 WLR 2450; [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 383, [31]. 
60  [2008] EWCA Civ 1452; [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 353. 
61  [2017] UKSC 43; [2017] 1 WLR 2581, [34]. Here, the contract rate is the non-breach position, and the spot-
hire rate is the (deemed) breach position. 
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In principle, where a claimant’s actual post-breach conduct is ignored, we think that their 
breach position falls to be assessed on the counterfactual basis as if they had taken steps to 
restore their non-breach position as nearly as possible. Consequently, the measure of loss 
suggested by Lord Clarke is correct if it was the case in The New Flamenco that other shorter 
charters or spot-hires would have been available if the owners had not chosen to sell the vessel. 
But, as we have already highlighted, this point is unclear from the arbitrator’s findings.62 If, on 
the other hand, shorter charters or spot-hires were also unavailable, then the appropriate 
measure of loss must instead be the difference between the profits that the owners would have 
earned under the original charter and the profits that they could have earned under whatever 
was the next closest available substitute, such as refurbishment for hire under another use. Of 
course, if there was no other commercial use at all for the vessel, then the actual sale would 
appropriately be taken into account in the assessment of damages and so no counterfactual 
assessment of the claimant’s breach position would be required. 
 
In the Supreme Court’s disposal of the appeal, a number of further issues remained to be 
resolved before a final assessment of damages could be made. These issues arose “at least in 
part by reasons of concessions made before the arbitrator”.63 In particular, in their original 
claim submissions (which the arbitrator refused to allow them to withdraw), the owners 
conceded that the charterers were entitled to a credit of US$5,145,000 in respect of various 
items of expenditure saved as a result of the sale and the “reduction in re-sale value between 
November 2007 and November 2009”.64 We can understand why the owners might have 
thought it tactically expedient to give this concession, so that the arbitrator might be tempted 
to find a halfway-house solution. However, if their case was that the actual sale should be 
ignored in the assessment of damages, we think that both elements of this concession were 
misconceived as a matter of law. 
 
So far as the saved expenditure is concerned, if the owners’ case was that the actual sale of 
the vessel should be ignored in assessing their damages, then it must be ignored for all purposes. 
In other words, the assessment of what we have called their breach position should be as if the 
vessel had been kept and chartered to other clients. On this hypothesis, there is no expenditure 
saved as a result of the breach. The expenditure under the breach position is the same as under 
the non-breach position because in both positions the owners are assumed to have been 
chartering out the vessel (and so incurring expenses in doing so). It is reasonable to assume 
that the expenses under the substitute shorter charters would have been roughly the same as 
under the original charter. Indeed, if anything, they might have been higher.  
 
In relation to the “reduction in re-sale value”, we surmise that the owners had in mind the 
ordinary depreciation that would have resulted from the additional age/wear and tear of the 
vessel if the charter had remained on foot, as distinct from the reduction attributable to the fall 
in the market (which is irrespective of the age/condition of the vessel). In our view, however, 
the assessment of damages does not permit claimants or defendants to cherry-pick one aspect 
of the relevant hypothetical world, but not another. In other words, either you take account of 
the actual sale (in which case neither the ordinary depreciation nor the market fall is suffered) 
or you assume that the owners retained the vessel, in which case both the ordinary depreciation 
                                                          
62  See text following n 7 above. 
63  Ibid, [37]. Lord Clarke proposed that the parties try to reach agreement on the issues that needed to be remitted 
to the arbitrator and that, failing such agreement, they should exchange submissions on the form the Court’s 
order should take. 
64  For further particulars, see the judgment of Popplewell J: [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm); [2014] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 230, [10][11]. 
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and the market fall is suffered. There is no possible world in which the clock runs on, such that 
the ordinary depreciation is suffered, but in which the market fall is somehow not suffered over 
the same time period. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The New Flamenco can now be added to the list of cases where claimants have recovered 
compensatory damages greater than their factual loss evident at the date of trial. By ignoring 
the actual sale, the award of damages left the owners in a better position (all things considered) 
than if the breach had not occurred. In terms of result, the Supreme Court’s decision thus serves 
to substantiate Popplewell J’s remark that “[t]he answer to the question whether a claimant is 
bound to bring a benefit into account in calculating his damages is not to be found in a simple 
application of the compensatory principle.”65 It is a shame, however, that the Court’s reasoning 
did not make any headway in clarifying the proper application of the compensatory principle, 
in all its complexity. 
 
Our internet researches have revealed that the good ship New Flamenco had a somewhat 
chequered life after being sold in 2007.66 The buyers, who it will be recalled paid a price of 
US$23,765,00, used it as a floating hotel for six months in New Caledonia but then went 
bankrupt. The ship was then seized and sold at auction for scrap for a mere $3.2m to a 
Singapore company. In 2012 the ship was saved from the scrapyard, renamed Ocean Dream, 
and began operating cruises, first between China and Vietnam, and later in the Gulf of Thailand. 
This operation ended when an inspection by the International Transport Workers Federation 
revealed shocking working conditions on board. After having been abandoned for a year 
without crew or maintenance, the ship finally sank a mere two miles from the coast of Thailand 
on 27 February 2016, with no-one on board. At last report it remained unsalvaged and, albeit 
only half submerged, a haven for divers. 
 
It was our hope that the ship’s legacy would be a worthwhile contribution to our 
understanding of the law of damages for breach of contract. Unfortunately, the brief and 
incomplete reasoning of the Supreme Court may result in the case sinking with even less trace 
than the ship itself. We have attempted to stave off this fate by taking the Court’s key reasoning 
– that the owners’ sale of the vessel was a “commercial decision at their own risk” – and 
drawing out its scope and implications by applying it to various circumstances similar to the 
one at hand. Given the frequency of litigation on issues of mitigation and causation of benefits 
in the recent past, it will surely not be long before one of these scenarios arises for consideration 
by the courts. 
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66  The vessel now has its own Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ocean_Dream_(1972_ship) 
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